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Point I
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By submitting a written order that varied from the terms of the trial court's verbal order,
Appellee obtained a final, written order in its favor.
Point II

2

Prior to the entry of the trial court's August 9, 2002 order, Appellants chose not to amend
their pleading to include additional non-wrongful lien claims and thus removed from
issue any additional claims that might have been considered by the trial court under Utah
Code Ann. §38-9-7(4).
Point III
At the conclusion of the July 17, 2002 hearing before the trial court, Appellee's motion
for attorney's fees was refused by the court. After being confronted with Appellants'
July 29, 2002 objection that Appellee's proposed order was a final order, Appellee was
on notice that the finality of the terms proposed in its form of order was in issue.
Nevertheless, Appellee failed to renew its motion for attorney's fees prior to the August
9, 2002 entry of that order and so forfeited any claim to attorney's fees, thus rendering
the attorney's fee provision of that order moot.

III. CONCLUSION
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I ARGUMENT
A.

Preliminary Statement of Disputed Facts

At page v in it's brief in its Statement of the Case, Appellee asserts that
Appellants' claim that Mr. Jenson never represented to them that the trust deed would not
be foreclosed upon, is false. Appellants dispute this claim and refer the Court to R. 444,
If 12 for factual averments laying out the basis for this claim by Appellants. Furthermore,
case authority is clear that the language in the trust deed does not control this issue.

B.

The Order Signed by the Trial Court Finally Ruled in Appellee's Favor

The Appellee asserts that the trial court never had an opportunity to rule on the
issue of attorney's fees, thus rendering its judgment non-final (but see R. 470 @ 53, 54).
But after the July 17, 2002 hearing Appellee submitted a proposed form of order to the
trial court which converted into a final order the non-final verbal order pronounced by the
trial court in open court. In particular, the trial court in its written order concluded that
the Appellee's trust deed was not a wrongful lien, thereby disposing of with prejudice all
of Appellants' claims before the trial court. And in fact, Appellants made formal
objection to the proposed written order submitted by Appellee to the trial court, arguing
that although the trial court had verbally pronounced a non-final order, its proposed
written order erroneously recited terms that made it a final order.

1

C.

Appellee had Prior Notice the August 9. 2002 Order When Entered
Would be Final.

In doing so, Appellants effectively put both the trial court and Appellee on notice
that the issue of attorney's fees must be addressed prior to entry into judgment of
Appellee's proposed written order. It may be useful to summarize the procedure
followed in this case:
i.

At the July 17, 2002 hearing the trial court verbally pronounced an order
that denied Appellants summary disposition on their wrongful lien claims.
At the close of that hearing, the trial court denied both Appellee's and
Appellants' verbal motions for attorney's fees. R.470 @ 53, 54;

ii.

On July 26, 2002 the Appellee submitted to the trial court a form of order
that by its terms found as a matter of law that Appellee's trust deed was not
a wrongful lien, thus going beyond the issue of summary disposition
addressed at the July 17, 2002 hearing, to dispose of all of Appellants'
claims,

iii.

On July 29, 2002 the Appellants objected that the proposed order was a
final order and inconsistent with the trial court's verbal order at the July 17,
2002 hearing. R. 273-277; 278-282.

iv.

Despite the Appellants objection that the proposed order was by its terms a
final order, prior to the entry of that order Appellee made no effort to renew
its motion for attorney's fees.

v.

On August 9, 2002 the trial court executed Appellee's proposed order. R.
2

303-306.
As the above procedural history makes clear, instead of filing a formal written
motion for attorney's fees prior to entry into judgment of its form of order, Appellee
elected to rely upon the language in the order it drafted, which in part states:
"Respondent's request for an award of attorney 'sfees is denied at this time.
The request is reservedfor consideration should this case continue."
Appellee did this after also having drafted into the order the term:
u

That portion of Petitioners' Petition that asserts a wrongful hen under Utah
Code Ann. §§38-9-1 et seq is hereby dismissed. ";
and having also drafted into the order the conclusion of law that:
u

The Trust Deed does not constitute a wrongful hen as that term is defined
in Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6). "
with full knowledge that the only claims plead by Appellants were wrongful lien claims.
Perhaps Appellee was seeking a particular procedural advantage by drafting an
order that by operation of its terms could only be final, but also purported to reserve the
issue of attorney's fees. Perhaps Appellee wished to force judicial modification of the
requirements ofProMaxv Raile. 2000 UT 4, ^[12 and Meadowbrook v. Flower. 959 P. 2d
115, 117 (Utah 1998X that one must move for attorney's fees prior to the entry of final
judgment or forfeit any claim to attorney's fees.
Although Appellees reasons for proceeding in this manner (like it's drafting of the
order) are somewhat murky, it is clear that the conditional reservation of attorney's fees
creates a procedural renvoi that has no case within which to operate. Note that the trial
court had already explicitly and repeatedly denied Appellee's verbal motion for
3

attorney's fees. In that light, what Appellee really advocates is a rule that allows a trial
court to dispose of on the merits all substantive issues before it in a case, refuse a motion
for attorney's fees and then reserve jurisdiction to revisit attorney's fees in that case on
the condition that the case continue before it on the merits. This woulda, coulda, shoulda
rule advocated by Appellees serves no proper judicial policy and only invites confusion
over this court's clear holdings on the issue of attorney's fees in Meadowbrook and
Promax.
D.

There Were No Additional Claims Left for Determination Under Utah
Code Ann. §38-9-7(4^

Appellee's remaining arguments are also disposed of when one applies this same
analysis to them. In light of the express terms of the trial court's conclusion of law in its
written order that the trust deed was not a wrongful lien, Appellee's claim that the trial
court refused to declare the partys' property rights is irrelevant. And that same
conclusion of law disposes of Appellee's claims that all the trial court did in its written
order was to refuse to grant Appellants summary nullification of the trust deed.
Furthermore, as the record clearly discloses, the July 17, 2002 hearing was not a
hearing on Appellants' objections but a hearing on Appellants' motion for new trial.
Finally, the other legal remedies that were potentially available to Appellants
under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4) are not at issue in this case. The trial court only had
wrongful lien issues before it and prior to the court's entry of its final judgment the
Appellants elected not to amend their pleading to pursue additional, non-wrongful lien,
remedies. As masters of their pleading, this was well within Appellants' discretion. Cf.
4

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams. 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987).

II

CONCLUSION
Appellants are masters of their petition and prior to the August 9, 2002 entry of

final judgment, they elected not to amend their petition to include non-wrongful lien
claims. As masters of their pleading Appellants did not bring into issue in this action any
other potential remedies under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4). Because Appellee's written
form of order converted a non-final verbal order to a final written order, Appellants in
their objection to that form argued that the trial court had on July 17, 2002 only verbally
declared a non-final order and on that basis objected to Appellee's written form of order.
By signing that written form of order the trial court entered final judgment against
Appellants. By failing to renew its application for attorney's fees prior to that order's
entry, Appellee waived its claim for attorney's fees.
DATED this 24th day of January, 2005.

RONALD ADY /
Attorney for Appellants
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